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The 2007 subprime crisis in the United States has 
triggered a succession of financial crises around the globe, 
reigniting interest in the contagion phenomenon. Not all 
crises, however, are contagious. This paper models a new 
channel of contagion where the degree of anticipation 
of crises, through its impact on investor uncertainty, 
determines the occurrence of contagion. Incidences 
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of surprise crises lead investors to doubt the accuracy 
of their information-gathering technology, which 
endogenously increases the probability of crises elsewhere. 
Anticipated crises, instead, have the opposite effect. 
Importantly, this channel is empirically shown to have an 
independent effect beyond other contagion channels.The Uncertainty Channel of Contagion¤
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11 Introduction
The spread of ¯nancial crises, or contagion, has reemerged as a pressing issue since the most
recent succession of ¯nancial and economic crises around the globe starting with the unrav-
eling of the subprime crisis in the United States in 2007. Prior to these events, emerging
market crises that started in Mexico in 1994-95, Thailand in 1997, and Russia in 1998 en-
tailed subsequent crises in neighboring and far-away economies. A similar accumulation of
crises occurred in industrialized countries in the context of the break-down of the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992. While these crisis events suggest contagion
e®ects across countries, several other episodes, such as the crises in Brazil in 1999, Turkey
in 2001, and Argentina in 2001-02, primarily remained local. These di®erential patterns
raise the question of why some crisis events entail contagion e®ects in other economies while
other crises do not.
Several recent papers have addressed this di®erential occurrence of contagion.1 A com-
mon theme arising from this literature is the dependence of contagion on the nature of the
crisis in the \initial-crisis" country. In particular, a distinction has been drawn between
\surprise crises"|crises that were unexpected by market participants|and \anticipated
crises"|crises that were largely expected well before they actually occurred. A variety of
measures have been used to identify the degree of anticipation. Kaminsky, Reinhart, and
Vegh (2003) use changes in domestic bond spreads, and revisions to sovereign credit rat-
ings, as a measure of the degree to which markets anticipate a crisis. Didier, Mauro, and
Schmukler (2006), instead, use net sales or purchases by mutual funds in the period lead-
ing up to a crisis. Finally, Rigobon and Wei (2003) and Mondria and Quintana-Domeque
(2007) use the number of news articles about a particular country as a measure of an-
ticipation. The consensus arising from these di®erent methodologies is that the earlier
crises|Mexico, Thailand and Russia|were largely unanticipated events, while the more
recent set of crises|Brazil, Turkey and Russia|were anticipated. The link between the
degree of anticipation and the occurrence of contagion has led some authors to regard the
surprise element as a necessary condition for contagion.2
The literature thus far has not come up with a satisfying mechanism to explain the
di®erential occurrence of contagion.3 Several papers have suggested that anticipation pro-
vides time for investors to scale back their exposure to the a®ected country, such that the
eventual crisis will not have signi¯cant overall wealth e®ects for the investor. This results in
a lower incidence of contagion with respect to the other countries in the investor's portfolio.
This explanation, however, has yet to be tested empirically. Furthermore, this reasoning
implies that surprise crises would not have any contagion e®ects in the absence of common
investors.
1See, for example, Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2003), Didier, Mauro, and Schmukler (2006) and
Rigobon and Wei (2003).
2Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2003), for example, consider it as one of the three necessary elements
in their \unholy trinity".
3An exception is Mondria (2006) where, in the event of a surprise crisis, investors reallocate their limited
attention to the crisis country, which induces them to liquidate positions in other countries. If a crisis was
anticipated instead, the investor can take the time necessary to increase her information processing resources
thus reducing the impact of the attention reallocation on other countries.
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Figure 1: Uncertainty around the period of the Thai crisis
This paper proposes a new channel for the international transmission of crises|the \un-
certainty channel of contagion"|that explains the di®erential pattern of contagion. Stylized
facts surrounding the Thai and Argentinean crises illustrate the potential relevance of this
channel. Figures 1 and 2 show the behavior of the degree of \uncertainty", as measured
by the dispersion of GDP forecasts based on surveys of private sector analysts, around the
period involving the Thai crisis (a surprise crisis) and the Argentinean crisis (an antici-
pated crisis). The two vertical bars in Figure 1 show the two most pronounced events in
the Thai crisis|the severe devaluation of the Baht in the beginning of July 1997 and the
substantial drop in stock market returns one month later.4 The individual lines show the
measure of uncertainty regarding fundamentals for a select group of countries. Following
the onset of the Thai crisis, uncertainty regarding fundamentals increased substantially for
several neighboring countries. In the case of Korea, the build-up of uncertainty was subse-
quently followed by a currency and stock market crisis in November of 1997. In contrast,
Figure 2 shows the behavior of the uncertainty measure around the Argentinean crisis in
2001. Following the announcement of default in December 2001, uncertainty regarding the
fundamentals of neighboring economies barely changed. In fact, as we will see later, the
level of uncertainty, conditional on other macroeconomic and ¯nancial variables, actually
decreased.
In line with these stylized facts, we present a theoretical model and empirical evidence
illustrating the di®erential occurrence of contagion after surprise versus anticipated crises.
The basic mechanism behind the model can be summarized as follows: Investors trade secu-
rities whose expected return is tied to the fundamentals of the economy in which the issuing
4The dates are chosen in accordance with Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2003) and Goldstein (1998).
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Figure 2: Uncertainty around the period of the Argentinean crisis
¯rm operates. The spread between the price of the security and its eventual payout is a
measure of the funding costs for the ¯rm. Investors, however, are imperfectly informed re-
garding the state of fundamentals, but can choose to acquire a form of information-gathering
technology that improves the precision of their information. The crucial assumption of the
model is that investors are unsure as to how precise the information-gathering technology
actually is. Instead, they have a belief regarding its precision, which they update by observ-
ing developments in other countries. If, for example, a surprise crisis happens in another
country, investors will feel less con¯dent about their information-gathering technology, and
consequently, ascribe a lower belief regarding its precision. In equilibrium, this change in
beliefs will lower the proportion of investors who adopt the information-gathering technol-
ogy and, hence, increase the aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals in the country
the investor is invested in. As this uncertainty increases, so does the spreads faced by the
¯rm, which in turn increases the probability of a crisis in the country. In other words,
surprise crises in one country lead investors to doubt the accuracy of their information and
lead them to rationally make decisions that increase the probability of a crisis in a second
country in which they have investments.
The model, as described above, yields two testable predictions. First, surprise (antici-
pated) crises result in an increase (decrease) in uncertainty, as measured by the dispersion
of beliefs regarding fundamentals, in other countries. Second, an increase in uncertainty
is associated with a higher probability of the incidence of a ¯nancial crisis. The empirical
analysis likewise proceeds in two distinct steps. First, we use ¯xed-e®ects panel estimations
to establish the link between the crisis in an initial crisis country and uncertainty regard-
ing fundamentals in other countries. Second, we validate the importance of uncertainty
by quantifying the e®ect of an increase in uncertainty on the probability of a crisis in an
4economy. While the ¯rst step is much more crucial to show the empirical relevance of the
suggested contagion channel, we run the second step for completeness.
We construct a rich data set comprising 38 countries with monthly data spanning the
period from December 1993 to September 2005. The sample of countries, and the associated
time frame, enables the inclusion of the following six signi¯cant crisis periods into the
analysis: Mexico (1994-95), Thailand (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Turkey (2001)
and Argentina (2001-02). These crises cover both currency crises as well as episodes of
sovereign debt default. In both cases, however, these episodes featured signi¯cant drops in
stock market returns in the respective economies. For comparability reasons, we therefore
focus on sharp drops in stock markets as our measure of crisis. This measure is also
consistent with the setup in the model where a crisis is de¯ned as an episode where ¯rms are
forced to abandon ongoing projects, thereby resulting in a collapse of their market value.
The empirical analysis provides strong evidence for the existence, and importance, of
the uncertainty channel of contagion. Firstly, we ¯nd that the incidence of the Mexican,
Thai and Russian crises|identi¯ed by the literature to be surprise crises|increase the level
of uncertainty regarding fundamentals in other countries. The e®ect is found to be stronger
for countries within the same region. In contrast, we ¯nd that anticipated crises, namely
the Brazilian, Turkish and Argentinean crises, actually decrease the level of uncertainty in
other countries, again with a stronger e®ect in the same region. The importance of changes
in the level of uncertainty is captured by our second main ¯nding, which shows that higher
uncertainty is associated with a higher probability of the occurrence of a crisis. Most
importantly, this e®ect is signi¯cant even after controlling for other channels of contagion
that have been proposed in the literature, such as common creditors, trade links, the size
e®ect of the initial stock market, and for overexposed common fund investors. As the
marginal analysis shows, the e®ect is also not negligible in size. The combination of our two
main ¯ndings con¯rms our hypotheses that surprise and anticipated crises have di®erent
contagion e®ects based on how they impact the level of investor uncertainty regarding
fundamentals.
The ¯ndings in this paper have a couple of important policy implications. The ¯rst,
and foremost, implication is that surveillance activities have to be an important element in
any e®ort to promote international ¯nancial stability. Apart from helping prevent crises in
the ¯rst place, the ¯ndings in this paper imply that early detection of underlying pressures,
through better bilateral or multilateral monitoring of fundamentals, can help reduce the risk
of negative spillovers to other, primarily neighboring, countries. The second implication of
our ¯ndings relate to the public disclosure of information. Greater disclosure, insofar as
it improves the precision of signals received by investors, has a bene¯cial e®ect in our
framework in terms of lowering the cost of funds. Transparency, for its own sake, however,
is not advocated. The release of more frequent, but noisier signals, can have harmful
implications if it increases the variation of beliefs regarding the true state of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we relate the current paper
to the existing literature on contagion. Following that, in sections 3 and 4, we describe the
model and the results from the empirical analysis. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusion.
52 Related Literature
The literature on contagion covers important contributions on both theoretical and empirical
fronts. Therefore, a signi¯cant challenge for this paper is to show that uncertainty has a sig-
ni¯cant e®ect on the propagation of crises over-and-above other channels that have already
been explored. While early research focused on trade linkages and macroeconomic similari-
ties between economies, more recent analyses have emphasized the role of common investors
| either through banks, (as in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), Kaminsky and Reinhart
(2000) and Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2004)), or mutual funds, (as in Broner, Gelos,
and Reinhart (2006) and Borensztein and Gelos (2003)).5 Theoretical advances regard-
ing the di®erent propagation mechanisms behind this channel, meanwhile, have examined
herding due to ¯xed information costs (Calvo and Mendoza (2000)), di®erentially-informed
investors (Kodres and Pritsker (2002)), and wealth e®ects (Goldstein and Pauzner (2004)).
While the model in the present paper has some parallels with the existing literature, it
contributes a new mechanism that explains the di®erential contagion patterns after surprise
versus anticipated crises. In the model, contagion occurs through the shift of a threshold
equilibrium induced by an increase in the variance of investors' private signals. In this
sense, the model features the same implications as those that arise in global game models,
such as presented in Morris and Shin (2003). These models, however, do not easily lend
themselves to accommodate notions of surprise versus anticipated crises, which we show to
be a key element in determining whether contagion happens or not. The model presented
in this paper also shares some similarities with Kodres and Pritsker (2002). As is the case
in the present paper, their model builds on the imperfect information, rational expectations
model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). The channel of contagion, however, is fundamentally
di®erent. In Kodres and Pritsker (2002), contagion occurs through portfolio rebalancing
due to shared macroeconomic risks, keeping the share of informed investors constant. In
contrast, the channel of contagion in the present paper relies on an endogenous shift in this
very share. The nature of this shift allows for a di®erential pattern of contagion depending
on whether the crisis is anticipated or not, a feature that is not present in Kodres and
Pritsker (2002).
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been an attempt to quantify the role
of uncertainty in the context of contagion. In this sense the present paper ¯lls a gap.
However, the impact of uncertainty on currency crises has been the subject of several
recent papers. Prati and Sbracia (2002) and Bannier (2006) study the impact of greater
dispersion of GDP forecasts on the Asian and Mexican crises respectively, focussing on the
time-series dimension of the data. Tillmann (2004), instead, uses the di®erence between
the price of closed-end equity funds and their underlying net asset values as a measure of
the heterogeneity of information to study the role of information disparities in the ERM
crisis. In addition to having a di®erent motivation, the empirical analysis in our paper also
di®ers substantially in a variety of ways. Firstly, by applying panel estimation techniques we
additionally exploit the cross sectional dimension of the data, which seems most appropriate
5For the literature on trade linkages see, for example, Gerlach and Smets (1996) and Glick and Rose
(1999) and on macroeconomic similarities, for example, Goldstein (1998).
6given the static nature of the underlying theoretical models in this branch of the literature.
Secondly, the data set spans a longer time horizon allowing us to consider more than just
one crisis episode. Thirdly, by focusing on sharp falls in stock markets, we also capture
more than just currency crises, which is the focus of all the studies mentioned above.
3 Model
The following model illustrates the mechanisms behind the uncertainty channel of contagion.
The model focuses on the type of crises for which this paper is interested in analyzing,
namely stock market crises. The hypotheses derived from the model are then empirically
validated in the next section.
3.1 Environment
The model features two countries, which we label as A and B, and two types of agents: a
representative ¯rm and foreign investors. We assume that there are two groups of foreign
investors, each a continuum of measure one, that invest exclusively in country A and country
B respectively. Time is discrete and divided into two periods: t = 1;2. The \fundamentals"
of an economy can be summarized by a single parameter, µc, where c 2 fA;Bg. Following
Angeletos and Werning (2006), we assume that the unconditional distribution of µ is the
improper uniform over the entire real line.
The representative ¯rm in each economy has an ongoing project, which requires funding
each period. The ¯rm faces two forms of uncertainty. The ¯rst is related to the rate of
return on its projects, which is tied to the level of fundamentals. The rate of return is
given by a function R(µ) 2 C2 where R0 > 0, R00 ¸ 0 and R(0) = 0. The second form
of uncertainty that the ¯rm faces is a private, unobserved, liquidity shock, Sc, which we
assume is drawn from a standard normal distribution: Sc » N(0;1) and c 2 fA;Bg. In
response to the liquidity shock, the ¯rm issues (or redeems) securities that are claims on
the residual value of the project. We assume for simplicity that the residual value per share
is given by the level of fundamentals, µ. The securities are issued at the beginning of the
period and the payo® is delivered at the end of the period. The ¯rm also has access to a
risk-free rate of return, which we normalize to zero.
Investors have preferences that take the form of the constant absolute risk aversion
utility function
U(W) = ¡e¡°W (1)
where W is end of period wealth and ° is the coe±cient of absolute risk aversion.
3.2 Information structure
The level of the fundamentals of an economy is not revealed perfectly to an investor. In-
stead, the investor only receives a signal on the fundamentals. The investor, however, can
7invest in a form of information-gathering technology, at a cost c, that improves the preci-
sion of her signal. One could think of c as the cost of setting up a research department,
for example. We will label investors who decide to acquire the information-gathering tech-
nology as \informed" (with subscript I) and investors who don't as \uninformed" (with
subscript U). As we will see later, having two di®erent groups of investors, informed versus
uninformed, is an intuitive way to motivate the increase in the actual variance of forecasts.6
Investors only receive signals related to the fundamentals of the country in which they are
investing in. Furthermore, we assume that both groups of investors have access to the same
information-gathering technology.7
The informed investor receives a signal, xI;i = µc + "I;i where "I;i » N(0;¾2
I). The
uninformed investor instead receives a signal, xU;i = µc + "U;i where "U;i » N(0;¾2
U). We
will ¯nd it more convenient to refer to the precisions of the signals, which are respectively
denoted as ®I = 1=¾2
I and ®U = 1=¾2
U. The stochastic variables, "I;i, "U;i and Sc, are
assumed to be independent of each other. As mentioned earlier, the information-gathering
technology has a higher signal precision, i.e., ®I > ®U. To simplify the discussion in the
rest of this section, we assume ®U = 1.
We introduce a behavioral element to this fairly standard setup. Investors are assumed
to be unsure about the actual precision of the technology. They have, however, a common
prior: ^ ®I > ®U. Investors judge the precision of the information-gathering technology by its
ability to predict \crises". If a crisis that is anticipated by the market materializes, investors
become more con¯dent about the technology and have posterior beliefs, ^ ®G
I > ^ ®I. If an
anticipated crisis does not occur, or if a surprise crisis occurs, investors become less con¯dent
in the technology and have posterior beliefs, ^ ®B
I where ®U < ^ ®B
I < ^ ®I. Note that, unlike
the bias inherent in self-attribution theories (see Bem (1965) or Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1998)), we allow for investors to adjust their priors both ways following
the observation of a public signal. One could think of the downward adjustment of the
posterior belief after a non-materialized anticipated crises in terms of an investment bank
starting to mistrust its research department that issues crises warnings without ever a crisis
happening. Later on, we will de¯ne precisely what the terms \anticipated" and \surprise
crises" mean within the context of this model. The measure of informed investors (which will
be later endogenously determined) is ¸. The measure of uninformed investors is therefore
(1 ¡ ¸).
3.3 Timing
The two periods in the model are set up such that all the events concerning country A
occur in period 1, while all events concerning country B occur in period 2. In our empirical
analysis in the next section, we will refer to country A as the \initial crisis" country. The
timing of events in period 1 is as follows:
6If instead there were only one group of investors, contagion could only occur if the actual variance of
forecasts were exogenously shifted in a di®erential manner depending on the nature of the initial crisis.
7Such an extreme assumption is not necessary. All we need is for investors to gain some knowledge
regarding their own technology by observing what happens in other countries.
81. Investors decide whether or not to invest in the information-gathering technology.
2. Investors receive their individual signals on µA and purchase (or short) the securities
issued by the ¯rm.
3. Based on the realized values of the fundamentals and their liquidity shock, the ¯rm
decides whether to continue its project or not.
Events in the second period follow the same ordering with the exception that investors
update their priors on the reliability of the information-gathering technology following the
events in Country A.
3.4 Investor's problem








Wi = W0;i ¡ Pckj;i + µckj;i ¡ Ij=I ¢ c (3)
where W0;i is initial wealth, Pc and µc are respectively the price and the payo® of the security
issued by the ¯rm in a given country while kj;i is the quantity demanded by investor i. The
subscript j 2 fI;Ug refers to whether the investor is informed or uninformed. If she chooses
to be informed (Ij=I = 1), then she pays c to obtain the technology.
As in much of the literature, we will restrict ourselves to linear price functions. Since
the supply of assets is uncertain and unobserved, the price realization serves as a signal
that, conditional on the realization of the fundamentals, is normally distributed (since Sc
is normal) with precision ®P. Therefore, the conditional distribution function of µc given
Pc and xj;i will also be normal with
E(µcjxj;i;Pc) =
^ ®j
®P + ^ ®j
xj;i +
®P




®P + ^ ®j
(5)
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using the properties of the lognormal distribution.
The ¯rst-order condition of the problem is then
¡ Pc +
^ ®j
®P + ^ ®j
xj;i +
®P




®P + ^ ®j
¶
(6)




(xj;i ¡ Pc) (7)
Given that there are ¸ informed investors and (1 ¡ ¸) uninformed investors and that
E(xj;ijµc) = µc, we have the following market clearing condition:
¸^ ®I
°
(µc ¡ Pc) +
(1 ¡ ¸)
°
(µc ¡ Pc) = Sc (8)
which gives us
Pc = µc ¡
°
¸^ ®I + (1 ¡ ¸)
Sc (9)
Equation (9) above is the equilibrium price of the security issued by the ¯rm in country
c, which has a level of fundamentals represented by µc and faces a liquidity shock of size Sc.
From the equilibrium price function above, we can see that lower beliefs on the precision of
the information-gathering technology results in a lower price obtained by the ¯rm when the
security is in positive supply. In a setup with perfect information, ^ ®I ! 1, the equilibrium
price will be exactly equal to the payout of the bond, µc. As we move away from this case,
the absolute value of the wedge between the price of the bond and its payout increases.
It is important to note that the liquidity shock is unobservable. If instead it were public
information, prices would be fully informative about the level of the fundamentals, rendering
the decision to be informed versus uninformed irrelevant.
3.5 Firm's problem
The ¯rm has an ongoing project which yields R(µ) for every unit invested. Regardless of
the liquidity shock, the ¯rm will abandon the project if the rate of return on the project is
lower than the risk-free rate of return, R(µ) < 0. Given the functional form assumptions
for R(¢), this condition is equivalent to µ < 0. In the event of a liquidity shock, the ¯rm
borrows funds from investors by issuing securities that are claims on the residual value of
the project.8 Based on the results in the last section, the ¯rm in a given country will be
able to raise Pc (µc;Sc) per share that it issues. The ¯rm will now continue the project if
the return from investing the funds that it raises, PcSc, is greater than its residual value,
µcSc:
R(µc)Pc(µc;Sc)Sc > µcSc (10)
The following proposition shows the existence of a cuto® value of µc, µ¤
c, below which
the project will be abandoned. This cuto® value is a function of the degree of investors' risk
aversion, °, the size of the liquidity shock, Sc, the beliefs on the precision of information, ^ ®I,
and the proportion of informed investors, ¸. The relationship of µ¤
c with these parameters
is stated in the Corollary to Proposition 1
8We interpret negative realizations of the liquidity shock as cases where the ¯rm has excess liquidity
resulting in a negative net supply of the security. In this case, the ¯rm will maintain the same criterion for
the continuation of the project as in the case where there are no liquidity shocks.
10Proposition 1 For a given realization of a positive liquidity shock, there exists a threshold
value of fundamentals, µ¤





such that the ¯rm will choose to discontinue its project if µc < µ¤
c (°;Sc; ^ ®I).
Corollary 1 Based on the equation that de¯nes µ¤
c, equation (11), we have that the thresh-
old value for fundamentals








(iii) is lower for higher beliefs on the precision of the information-gathering technology,
@µ¤
c
@^ ®I < 0.




A higher threshold value for the level of fundamentals implies a higher conditional
likelihood, from the viewpoint of investors, that the ¯rm will discontinue its project. The
results in the Corollary to Proposition 1 show that the ¯rm is more likely to abandon
its project if investors are more risk-averse, if it faces larger liquidity shocks and, more
importantly for the purposes of this paper, if the variance of beliefs regarding the level of
fundamentals increases.
The discontinuation of a project will result in a loss of value for the ¯rm from the
expected stream of returns from the project. We interpret this sharp loss of value as a crisis
episode. While, in reality, ¯rms are terminating and starting projects on an ongoing basis,
the use of the term \crisis" in this case is justi¯ed as we have a representative ¯rm in our
model. The discontinuation of a project for the ¯rm in the model, therefore, would translate
to a drop in the stock market index for the country. We will be using this de¯nition of a
crisis in our empirical analysis.
We can now be more precise about the de¯nition of an anticipated or surprise crisis,
within the framework presented in this model. Recall that investors in country B do not get
any private signals regarding the fundamentals in country A. They do, however, observe the
price of the security, PA. As we have seen in the discussion of investor behavior, prices in
this model serve as an aggregator of information, albeit an imprecise one. The \market"'s
expectation of the level of fundamentals can therefore be summarized by the expected value
of µA conditional on the price of the ¯rm's security: E[µAjPA].
As mentioned earlier, investors are assumed to update their common priors on the
precision of the information-gathering technology based on its ability to predict crises.
Based on the information available to investors, we can say that a crisis is anticipated if
either E[µAjPA] < 0, which is the case where the rate of return on the project is lower than
the risk-free rate, or E[PAR(µA)¡µAjPA;SA > 0] < 0, which is the case where the net rate
11of return on the project is negative given that the ¯rm faces a positive liquidity shock. Since
all investors share a common information set, they will have a common posterior belief on
the precision of the information-gathering technology based on whether an anticipated crisis
materializes or not.
3.6 Endogenizing the share of informed investors
The linkages between the behavior of investors and ¯rms in this model make crises endoge-
nous. For a given positive realization of the liquidity shock for the ¯rm and a given level of
fundamentals, lower beliefs by investors regarding the precision of forecasts make it more
likely that the ¯rm will abandon its project, thus resulting in a crisis.
Unfortunately, we do not observe investors' beliefs on the precision of the forecasts.
Instead, we only observe the actual variance of forecasts, which does not depend on beliefs
of investors, but rather on the true variance of the process. Since we assume that the noise
terms for the informed and uninformed signals are uncorrelated, we have that the variance
of forecasts, conditional on µ, is
V (forecastjµ) = ¸2¾2
I + (1 ¡ ¸)2¾2
U (12)
As indicated by equation (12), the observed variance of forecasts changes with the
proportion of informed versus uninformed investors. In order to explain changes in the
observed variance of forecasts, we now endogenize the investors decision to acquire the
information-gathering technology.
The decision to acquire the information-gathering technology is done prior to the be-
ginning of each period and prior to the realization of any of the random variables. Since
all agents are ex-ante identical, all investors will decide to acquire the investment technol-
ogy if EUI > EUU, where EUI is the expected utility of the informed and EUU is the
expected utility of the uninformed. Likewise, no one will acquire the technology if the op-
posite inequality holds. An interior solution, ¸ 2 (0;1), will be obtained only when we have
EUI = EUU. The following proposition shows us how the share of informed investors is
determined in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The share of informed investors, ¸, in equilibrium will be as follows:
² ¸ = 0 if c > b
² ¸ = 1 if c < a; and
² ¸ 2 (0;1) if c 2 [a;b].







and b = 1
2° ln(^ ®I).
The share of informed investors in equilibrium depends on the cost of acquiring the
information-gathering technology, c. If the cost of acquiring the technology is too large or
too small, we will have either all investors choosing not to acquire the technology or all
of them choosing to be informed. For intermediate values of c, however, we will have an
interior value for the share of informed investors. We then have the following Corollary:
12Corollary 2 Let the cost of acquiring information-gathering technology be such that we
have an interior solution for ¸. We then have that the fraction of informed investors
increases for higher beliefs of the precision of the information-gathering technology, @¸
@^ ®I > 0,
for beliefs ^ ®I that are not too large.
As investors' beliefs regarding the precision of the information-gathering technology
increases, Corollary 2 states that the share of informed investors increases. The shift in the
extensive margin of informed investors will then change the observed variance as noted by
equation (12). The quali¯er \for beliefs ^ ®I that are not too large", however, is necessary
due to the information content embedded in prices. As in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), the informativeness of prices in this model has a
paradoxical implication in that the more informative prices are, the less incentives there are
for individual agents to acquire information, which in turn makes prices less informative.
So, if investors' beliefs regarding the precision of the information-gathering technology are
too high, then any further increase will reduce the share of investors who choose to acquire
the technology since they can rely on the information content in prices instead. The e®ect of
higher beliefs regarding the precision of the information-gathering technology on the share
of informed investors is, therefore, ultimately an empirical question. We will verify this
hypothesis in the empirical section.
3.7 Summary of model and testable hypotheses
In summary, the various elements of the model illustrate the di®erent contagion e®ects of an
anticipated versus a surprise ¯nancial crisis. If a surprise crisis occurs, investors attribute a
lower level of precision to their information-gathering technology, which leads to a smaller
share of investors adopting the technology (Corollary 2). The resulting higher variance of
forecasts endogenously increases the probability of a crisis (Corollary 1 (iii) and (iv)).
The intuition behind the result is as follows: When faced with a noisier signal, investors
behave less aggressively with respect to the information content of their signal. From their
demand function, equation (7), we see that investors purchase (or short) fewer securities
for a given divergence between the price of the security and what they expect the payout
to be, as the precision of their information falls. This makes the price a noisier signal on
fundamentals. From the perspective of the ¯rm, this increases the wedge between the price
that they obtain per security and the payout that they need to make. In other words, their
cost of funds increases making the termination of a project more likely.
Based on the results in this section, we have two testable hypotheses, which we take up
in turn in the next section:
Hypothesis 1 An anticipated (surprise) crisis in Country A results in an decrease (in-
crease) in the variance of forecasts regarding the fundamentals in Country B.
Hypothesis 2 An increase (decrease) in the variance of forecasts results in a higher (lower)
probability of a crisis in Country B.
13There are several elements of the model that merit some discussion. Firstly, the use of
distinct groups on investors, at a ¯rst glance, seems to contradict the increasing evidence
that common investors have been at the heart of recent episodes of contagion. The goal
of this paper, however, is to show that uncertainty regarding fundamentals is a distinctly
di®erent channel of contagion from the other channels that have been explored. While the
use of separate investors was primarily to simplify certain aspects of the model, it serves
to underscore our point that the uncertainty channel of contagion does not require the
group of investors to be the same across countries. What is crucial instead is that investors
gain some knowledge regarding the precision of their information signals by observing what
happens in other countries.
The model has also abstracted from most of the other contagion channels, such as trade
links or other macroeconomic factors, by assuming that the fundamentals are independent.
However, one can imagine extensions of this model to cases where the fundamentals are
correlated, say through a common regional shock. A common investor, in this case, could
then be receiving signals of this regional shock and update her beliefs regarding the precision
of this signal based on whether a surprise or anticipated crisis happens somewhere else in
the region. A surprise crisis then will lead the investor to lower her beliefs regarding the
precision of her signal, with similar consequent e®ects as in the current model. In fact, we
¯nd evidence of such a regional response in our empirical analysis, suggesting that such an
extension may be worth pursuing for future research.
Finally, as our model has implications for the optimality of public disclosure of infor-
mation, it is worth contrasting our model with that of Morris and Shin (2002). In their
model, a coordination element between agents results in situations where the public re-
lease of information can reduce welfare. There are no coordination problems in our model
and, therefore, better public information, insofar as it improves the precision of investor
forecasts, is welfare improving.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we subject the two hypotheses derived from the model to empirical analysis.
An important aspect of the empirical analysis is the veri¯cation of a separate and non-
negligible e®ect of uncertainty on the spread of crises beyond other channels of contagion
that have already received attention in the literature. In what follows, we ¯rst describe the
estimation methodology followed by a description of the data set. We then report the main
results along with some analysis of robustness.
4.1 Methodology
The empirical strategy is designed as a two-step procedure: In the ¯rst step, we estimate
the e®ect of the crisis in an initial crisis country, labeled A, on uncertainty in another
country, labeled B. In doing so, we control for other potential domestic and external
drivers of uncertainty. In the second step, we analyze the e®ect of uncertainty regarding
fundamentals in countries B on the probability of a crisis there. In this second step, we
14control for alternative contagion channels, such as trade links, common creditors, and over-
exposed fund investors. Additionally, we control for domestic and external drivers of crises.
4.1.1 Estimating the e®ect of the initial crisis on uncertainty
In the ¯rst step of our empirical analysis, we estimate the e®ect of the crisis in Country A
on uncertainty in Country B employing ¯xed e®ects panel regressions. For this purpose we
specify the following test:
UNCB;t = ®0 + ®1CRArg;t¡1 + ... + ®6CRTur;t¡1
+®7CRB;t¡1 + ®8ZB;t¡1 + ®9INTt¡1 + ±B + "B;t (13)
where UNCB;t signi¯es the level of uncertainty in a country B at time t, and CRA;t¡1
captures crisis dummies for countries A. This set of initial crisis countries consists of
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey, commonly identi¯ed as initial
crises countries in the literature.9 We exclude these six countries from the group of countries,
B. The other variables in the regression is a set of control variables: CRB;t¡1 represents a
dummy of crisis incidences in Country B itself, ZB;t¡1 represents other potential domestic
drivers of uncertainty, such as the mean of growth expectations, stock market volatility, and
proxies for economic, ¯nancial and political risks while INTt represents the interest rate
in advanced economies which has shown to have a strong impact on capital °ows into and
out of emerging markets. ±B captures country ¯xed e®ects. The level of uncertainty varies
signi¯cantly across countries, pointing to systematic di®erences between countries which
necessitate the control for country e®ects. Finally, "B;t captures the error term.
4.1.2 Estimating the e®ect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis
In the second step of our empirical analysis, we measure the e®ect of uncertainty on the
probability of a crisis. For this purpose, we run two sets of discrete-dependent variable
regressions. First, we specify the following test:
















where G(:) represents the standard normal and the logistic cumulative distribution func-
tions, respectively, in the probit and logit estimations we run. The conditioning vector X
refers to all the right-hand-side variables. CTGA;B;t¡1 represents the set of control variables
for alternative channels of contagion from Country A to Country B. We control for almost
9See sources cited in the Introduction.
15all other channels that have been highlighted in previous research: common creditors, trade
links, dependence on a common overexposed fund investors, and the market size of the crisis
country. These control variables are interacted with the crisis dummy for the initial-crisis
countries, which are the same set of countries used in the ¯rst step of our analysis. Ad-
ditionally, ZB;t¡1 represents a set of potential domestic drivers of crises, such as the lag
of mean of growth expectations and the lag of stock market volatility. As before, INTt¡1
represents the interest rate in advanced economies, and ±B country e®ects.
The coe±cient of interest here is ¯2, which captures the e®ect of uncertainty regarding
fundamentals on the probability of a crisis. The use of the interaction term, however,
carries the risk that the coe±cient simply picks up the direct e®ect of the crises in A rather
than the e®ect of uncertainty. To ensure that this is not the case, we estimate a separate
set of regressions where we enter the uncertainty variable and the initial crises variables
separately:
Prob(CRB = 1jX¯) = Gf¯0 + ¯1CRA;t¡1 + ... + ¯6CRA;t¡1
+ ¯7UNCB;t¡1 + ¯8ZB;t¡1 + ±B + ´B;tg (15)
The variables have the same interpretation as before.
Since probit models do not lend themselves to consistent estimates of the coe±cients
in a ¯xed e®ects regression, we use a pooled probit with dummies for country e®ects. For
robustness, we run the same sets of regressions assuming a logistic distribution. In addi-
tion, we estimate a linear probability model to overcome the potential incidental-parameter
problem.
4.2 Data
We build a rich data set comprising monthly observations from December 1993 to Septem-
ber 2005. The sample comprises 38 countries|15 developed and 23 emerging|where the
selection of the period and countries re°ects availability of data. The set of countries is
listed in Table 4 in the Appendix.
The explanatory variable that is of interest in the current analysis is uncertainty regard-
ing fundamentals. Based on our model, uncertainty is de¯ned as the variance of private
signals around the true value of the fundamentals that a®ect the rate of return on invest-
ments. Such data, however, is not directly observable. Since the return on investment
typically correlates strongly with the growth rate of output, we follow Prati and Sbracia
(2002) and use the standard deviation of GDP growth forecasts from Consensus Economics
as a reasonable proxy.10
To match our empirical analysis with the model presented earlier, we de¯ne a crisis
as an episode that features a sharp drop in stock returns. Monthly stock market returns,
10See Table 5 in the Appendix for a description of the exact construction of the variable. In the main
analysis, we use a weighted average of current and following year forecasts as described in Table 5. However,
as a robustness check we repeat all estimations using only current year forecasts, and only following-year
forecasts, separately. The results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar.
16computed from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) investable US dollar total
return index, serve as a basis for this crisis dummy. We use nominal US dollar returns
because we are interested in the optimization problem of a foreign investor.11 When needed,
we complement the returns with data from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
or national sources.12 With these data on stock market returns, we construct a binary crisis
variable in which a month is counted as a crisis month if the total return undershoots its
sample mean by more than two standard deviations. After this initial drop, the subsequent
months are also counted as crisis months until returns revert to the one standard deviation
band around the sample mean.
As noted in the previous sections, we use a rich set of domestic control variables. The
mean of growth forecasts, obtained from Consensus Economics, is used to control for the
state of the economy, while the volatility of stock market returns is used to disentangle the
e®ect of uncertainty regarding fundamentals from general high variability in the domestic
market. Additionally, we use indices of ¯nancial, economic, and political risk computed
by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to control for potential domestic reasons
for changes in uncertainty. In the context of contagion, these indicators were ¯rst used by
Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006) .
Following Fernandez-Arias (1996) and the extensive literature on \push" and \pull"
factors of capital °ows into and out of emerging markets, we use the interest rate on 10-
year US government bonds to control for interest rates in advanced economies, an important
external driver of investment decisions in emerging markets.
The key set of control variables that we include relate to alternative channels of con-
tagion. A variety of alternative contagion channels appear to be relevant in the context of
stock market drops. Firstly, we control for contagion through common creditors. In line
with Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), we use consolidated data of BIS banking statistics
to construct an index of contagion through the presence of a common creditor. However, we
construct a di®erent index from theirs. The index used in this paper re°ects the dependence
on common creditors as opposed to their measure, which re°ects competition for funds. In
the context of stock market drops, the dependence on common investors appears more rel-
evant than competition for their funding.13 Another relevant channel of contagion is trade
linkages with the crisis country. Following Glick and Rose (1999), we use bilateral export
data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics to construct the measure of trade links.
However, in contrast to their measure, we use the share of exports to Country A relative to
Country B's total exports. Finally, we also control for the possibility of contagion through
common overexposed fund investments, using the index developed by Broner, Gelos, and
Reinhart (2006).
11The investable indices take into consideration restrictions on foreign investment. Therefore, this measure
represents the part of the national stock markets accessible to foreign investors, which is relevant in the
context of contagion.
12For more details, please refer, to Table 5 in the Appendix.
13For details on the construction of this index, please refer to Table 5 in the Appendix.
174.3 Results
We now discuss the estimation results of equations (13) to (15). Our ¯ndings suggest
that the uncertainty channel of contagion does indeed play a role in spreading crises across
economies. First, we ¯nd a signi¯cant and robust e®ect of the initial crisis on uncertainty in
other countries in the direction predicted by the model|surprise crises increase uncertainty
in other countries while anticipated crises have the opposite e®ect. Second, we ¯nd a
signi¯cant and robust e®ect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis. Importantly, we
¯nd that the e®ect is robust to the inclusion of various alternative channels of contagion.
4.3.1 E®ect of a crisis on uncertainty in other countries
Table 1 summarizes the results of the ¯xed-e®ects panel regressions, equation (13), with
the di®erent columns corresponding to di®erent subsamples and estimation techniques. The
analysis of the e®ect of an initial crisis on uncertainty regarding fundamentals in other coun-
tries shows an interesting pattern: We ¯nd that the Mexican, Russian, and Thai crises|
identi¯ed as surprise crises in the literature|signi¯cantly increase uncertainty regarding
fundamentals in other countries. However, in the case of the three other crises, the Brazil-
ian, Turkish, and Argentinean crises|identi¯ed as anticipated crises in the literature|the
panel analysis shows a di®erent pattern: The Turkish and Argentinean crises signi¯cantly
decrease the level of uncertainty in potentially-a®ected countries. These results are robust
to the choice of regional or emerging markets sub-samples and the inclusion of a large
number of control variables. The e®ect of the Brazilian crisis is less clear.
Some interesting results emerge from a closer look at the coe±cients on the surprise
crises. Surprise crises prompt stronger e®ects on uncertainty in emerging markets than in
all countries. This ¯nding might re°ect higher costs of information gathering in emerging
markets that are on average less transparent than advanced economies.14 This could explain
a higher disincentive to investors to bear the cost of acquiring information about emerging
if surprised by a crisis. The estimations also show strong positive e®ects of surprise crises
within their own region. Of the three surprise crises, the Thai crises had the strongest impact
on uncertainty in other countries. Viewed through the lens of the model, this observation
suggests that the Thai crisis shattered the con¯dence in information-gathering technology
more than the other two surprise crises. The coe±cients for anticipated crises display a
similar pattern, with a stronger impact in emerging markets. While the incidences of the
Argentinean and Turkish crises resulted in a stronger decrease in the standard deviation of
growth forecasts in the emerging market sub-sample than in all countries, the e®ect of the
Brazilian crisis is not clear. In the regressions it turns out insigni¯cant.
The coe±cients on the control variables used in the regressions have the expected signs.
In particular, as expected, the US bond yield has a positive and strongly signi¯cant e®ect
on the uncertainty around the world, with a stronger e®ect in emerging markets. Also, as
expected, the lag of the mean of growth expectations impacts uncertainty negatively. This
variable can be interpreted as a summary of the state of the fundamentals together with
14See Gelos and Wei (2005) for a thorough discussion of the role of transparency in investment decisions




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Step 1: E®ect of crisis in A on uncertainty in B
19investors' expectations about it. If the fundamentals are good|or everyone expects them
to be good|then disagreement about the fundamentals decreases. The lag of the crises
in the potentially-a®ected countries shows a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on uncertainty.
Past stock market volatility also has a strong positive and signi¯cant e®ect on uncertainty.
Additionally, we use the ¯nancial, economic, and political risk indices from ICRG as a
summary of risk factors in the economy, in°uencing the level of uncertainty. The coe±cients
on these variables are mostly not signi¯cant in the regressions.
To summarize the ¯ndings of the ¯rst step of our analysis: The analysis shows that
surprise crises, such as the Mexican, Russian, and Thai crises, signi¯cantly increased our
measure of uncertainty in other countries. Meanwhile, anticipated crises, such as the Ar-
gentinean, Turkish, and Brazilian crises, decreased uncertainty in other countries. These
¯ndings are in line with the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model.
4.3.2 E®ect of increased uncertainty on the probability of a crisis
In the second step of the analysis, we show that increased uncertainty regarding fundamen-
tals increases the probability of a crisis in a country. We begin by running a pooled probit
regression of the incidence of a crisis in a country on the interaction of uncertainty in that
country with the incidence of an initial crisis, controlling for a set of other factors, as spec-
i¯ed in equation (14). Apart from the controls for country e®ects and the U.S. long-term
interest rate in ¯nancial centers, the control variables can be classi¯ed into two categories:
(1) alternative contagion channels, which could in°uence the likelihood of a crisis in the
potentially-a®ected countries, and (2) domestic control variables.
Table 2 displays the results of this regression. The ¯rst two columns of Table 2 show
that the uncertainty variable has a positive and strongly signi¯cant e®ect on the probability
of a crisis in a particular country. Column (2) shows that the e®ect is stronger in emerging
economies, once again possibly re°ecting the greater degree of information asymmetry in
these economies. As a robustness test we also run logit regressions. While column (3)
shows that the positive e®ect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis is not signi¯cant
at conventional levels in the set of all countries, column (4) shows that the e®ect is positive
and signi¯cant for emerging markets when assuming a logistic distribution. Introducing
the dummies into the pooled probit and logit regressions does not seem to create a severe
incidental parameter problem, as is apparent from the results using the linear probability
model in columns (5) and (6). The magnitude of the e®ect is smaller, but the e®ect is
still strongly signi¯cant and not negligible. These results continue to hold when we only
consider the set of surprise crises, which were found to increase the level of uncertainty in
other countries (see Table 6 in the Appendix).
With regard to alternative contagion channels, the following variables are controlled
for: the common creditor channel of contagion, the direct trade channel, contagion from
important stock markets, and contagion through common overexposed fund investors. If
not controlling for overexposed common fund investors, we ¯nd that common creditors and
trade shares have a high explanatory power for the occurrence of a crises in the potentially-
a®ected countries (see Tables 2 and 6). However, when we additionally control for overex-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Step 2: E®ect of uncertainty on the probability of crisis, all initial crises countries
21Appendix). At least in the emerging market sample for which we can control for the over-
exposure channel, the common creditors and trade share channels do not appear entirely
robust.15
Finally, as explained in section 4.1.2, care must be taken to ensure that we are not
merely picking up the direct e®ect of the crises in the initial-crises countries, rather than
the e®ect of uncertainty, when interacting the level of uncertainty in B with the crises in
the initial-crises countries. Table 3 shows the result of the regression where the uncertainty
variable and the initial crisis variable enter separately. Even here, we ¯nd that uncertainty
has a distinctly positive, and signi¯cant e®ect, on a crisis event in the same economy.
Together with the ¯ndings in the previous section, the results in the current section
support the theoretical model and validate the existence of the uncertainty channel of
contagion. Uncertainty regarding fundamentals in a country increases with the occurrence
of a surprise crisis in another country. The uncertainty, in turn, leads to an increase in
the probability of a crisis. Conversely, in the case of an anticipated crisis in the ¯rst
country, uncertainty in the second country is reduced, thereby decreasing the probability
of a crisis in the second country. Calculating marginal e®ects makes clear that the e®ect
of the uncertainty on the probability of crises in the potentially-a®ected countries is not
negligible (see Table 8 for details).
5 Conclusion
The global ¯nancial crisis that started in the subprime mortgage market in the U.S. has re-
inforced the notion that contagion is a recurring feature of ¯nancial crises in both emerging
and advanced economies. The transmission of crises across borders has signi¯cant welfare
implications and, as such, an understanding of the underlying mechanism is of paramount
importance. This paper contributes to this understanding by examining the role of uncer-
tainty in the occurrence of contagion. This topic has not received much attention, especially
on the empirical front. The channel °eshed out in this paper can rationalize why contagion
sometimes occurs, but sometimes does not. After observing a surprise crisis, investors begin
to doubt the accuracy of their information, which endogenously increases the probability of
a crisis occurring in another country. We call the transmission of crises across countries due
to the increased uncertainty regarding the fundamentals of the economy the \uncertainty
channel of contagion".
While the present analysis con¯rms the ¯ndings in the existing literature regarding the
relevance of other contagion channels, such as overexposed fund investors, trade links and
common creditors, the striking result in this paper is that uncertainty, as we de¯ne it, plays
a role in explaining contagion patterns over-and-above these other channels. Furthermore,
15We include the channel through overexposed fund investors in separate regressions due to the fact that
the index of overexposed common creditors only covers the sample of emerging markets, excluding Ukraine.
We are very thankful to Gaston Gelos for making the overexposure index available to us. Due to the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Step 2: E®ect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis, without any interaction.
23as the analysis of the marginal e®ects shows, the e®ect of the uncertainty channel is not
negligible.
The harmful spillovers that result from an unanticipated crisis suggest a greater role for
bilateral or multilateral surveillance. Closer monitoring of the fundamentals of a country,
can minimize the risk of a surprise crisis in one country resulting in harmful spillovers to
other countries. With regards to the ongoing debate on the merits of public disclosure of
information, the results in this paper advocate greater transparency only insofar as it im-
proves the precision of investor forecasts regarding the state of the economy. More frequent
releases of noisier signals end up being costly if it results in more investor uncertainty.
246 Appendix
Proposition 1 For a given realization of a positive liquidity shock, there exists a threshold
value of fundamentals, µ¤





such that the ¯rm will choose to discontinue its project if µc < µ¤
c (°;Sc; ^ ®I).
Proof. In the event of a liquidity shock, the ¯rm will only continue the project if R(µ)P (µ;S) >









At µ < 0, we know that R < 0 and so the project will be discontinued since the return on
the project is lower than the risk-free return. At µ = 0, we have equation (16) holding at
equality since R(0) = 0.
The slope of the left hand side of the inequality is given by
@
@µ








At µ = 0, the slope is ¡
°
¸^ ®I+(1¡¸)SR0 (0) < 0. Therefore, the left-hand-side of equation (16)
is decreasing at µ = 0 while the right-hand-side is increasing. The second derivative of the
function, however, is given by
@2




¸^ ®I + (1 ¡ ¸)
S
¸
+ 2R0 (µ) (18)
which is positive as µ increases. The graph de¯ned by the left-hand-side of the inequality
will, therefore, intersect with the graph de¯ned by the right-hand-side at some value of µ,
µ¤ > 0 implicitly de¯ned by
R(µ¤)P (µ¤;S) = µ¤







> µ for µ > µ¤.
Corollary 1 Based on the equation that de¯nes µ¤
c, equation (11), we have that the thresh-
old value for fundamentals








(iii) is lower for higher beliefs on the precision of the information-gathering technology,
@µ¤
c
@^ ®I < 0.




25Proof. The results in the Corollary are obtained through the use of the Implicit Function
Theorem on equation (11). We show the derivation for result (i) while the other three
results can be derived in an analogous manner. The partial derivative of µ¤ with respect to












+ R(µ¤) ¡ 1
(19)
The numerator of the fraction on the right-hand-side is unambiguously positive. The overall
sign of the derivative, therefore, depends on the sign of the denominator. The denominator,
however, can be shown to be positive. From the proof for Proposition 1, we saw that the
graph de¯ned by R(µ)P (µ;S) intersects the 45-degree line from below at µ = µ?. Therefore,






+R(µ¤) is greater than 1, which
makes the denominator positive. The proofs for the other two results proceed in a similar
fashion.
Proposition 2 The share of informed investors, ¸, in equilibrium will be as follows:
² ¸ = 0 if c > b
² ¸ = 1 if c < a; and
² ¸ 2 (0;1) if c 2 [a;b].







and b = 1
2° ln(^ ®I).
Proof. We ¯rst have to ¯nd EUI and EUU where the expectation is taken prior to the
realization of any uncertainty.
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µ
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¸^ ®I + (1 ¡ ¸)
S)
¶¶¸
where we have left out the subscripts denoting country c and investor i.
Let a1 = W0 ¡ c; a2 =
°
¸^ ®I+(1¡¸) and a3 = ^ ®I
° .
We then have
EUI = E [¡exp(¡° (a1 + a2a3S("I;i + a2S)))] (20)
By the independence assumption made earlier, the vector (S;"I) has a bivariate normal










































Let a4 = 1
2 + °a2
2a3; a5 = 1





























































= ¡exp(¡°(W0 ¡ c))
µ
1









We can ¯nd EUU in an analogous manner. With the results above, we have ¸ = 1 if
EUI > EUU, or
¡ exp(¡°(W0 ¡ c))
µ
1
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Analogously, we have ¸ = 0 if EUI < EUU, or
¡ exp(¡°(W0 ¡ c))
µ
1
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27Corollary 2 Let the cost of acquiring the information-gathering technology be such that
we have an interior solution for ¸. We then have that the fraction of informed investors
increases for higher beliefs of the precision of the information-gathering technology, @¸
@^ ®I > 0,
for beliefs ^ ®I that are not too large.
Proof. For interior solutions, the share of informed investors is given by
¸ =
1





































^ ®I ¡ e2°c¢¤1=2 >
° (^ ®I + 1)
2
(35)









2° ln(^ ®I). At one extreme point, c = b, we can easily show that the inequality (35)
holds. At the other extreme, c = a, we can rewrite inequality (35) as
°^ ®I
¡
°2 + ^ ®I
¢






°2 + ^ ®I
¢







°2 + ^ ®I
¢












^ ®I + °3 < 0 (37)
which holds as long as ^ ®I is not too large.
286.1 Figures and Tables
Developed Countries  Emerging Market Countries 
Asia & Australia 
Western Europe & 
North America 
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Western Europe & 
North America 














































Table 4: Sample of countries
29Variables  Measures  Sources 
Crisis measure:     
Significant drop in stock market returns  Basis for the crisis measure is the 
percentage change in US $ national, 
total return, stock market indices 
relative to the previous month. A 
month is counted as a crisis month if 
the total return drops at least 2 
standard deviations below the sample 
mean. Subsequent months are also 
counted as crisis months until returns 
move back into the one standard 
deviation band around the sample 
mean. 
2 sets of crisis measures: 1) IFC 
investable, total return indices, 
2) MSCI total return indices. For 
both cases, we have to use local 
sources for Romania, Slovakia 
and Romania. To convert returns 
from these three national indices 
into US dollars, we use end of 
period data on exchange rates 
from the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Explanatory Variables:     
Uncertainty measure  Monthly data of the weighted 
average of the standard deviations of 
the current and following year 
forecast of GDP growth across 
survey respondents. In January, the 
standard deviation of the current year 
forecast is given a weight of 11/12 
while the standard deviation of the 
following year forecasts is given a 
weight of 1/12. In February, the 
current year forecast receives a 
weight of 10/12 while the follwing 
year forecast is weighted by 2/12. 
This scheme continues until 
December where a weighting of 0/12 
is given for the current year forecast 
and 12/12 for the following year 
forecast. 
Consensus Economics 
Mean growth expectations  Monthly data of the weighted 
average of the mean forecast by 
survey respondents of the current and 
following year GDP growth. The 
weighting scheme is the same as for 
the standard deviation. 
Consensus Economics 
Stock market volatility  Standard deviation of daily returns 
calculated using a rolling window of 
three months. 
Same as crisis measure. 
However, restricted availability 
of daily returns. 
Changes in political risk  Monthly change in the political risk 
indicator. 
ICRG 
Changes in economic risk  Monthly change in the economic risk 
indicator. 
ICRG 
Changes in financial risk  Monthly change in the financial risk 
indicator. 
ICRG 
Interest rate in financial center  Monthly average of 10 year US 
government bond yield 
BLOOMBERG – GT10 GOVT 
30Variables  Measures  Sources 
Alternative contagion channels: 
Index of common creditors  Measures the degree of dependence 
on the same creditors as the initial 
crisis country. The index is computed 
as the sum over all creditors of the 
product of the dependence of country 
B on creditor i and the importance of 
the initial crisis country, A, for 
creditor i. The dependence of country 
B on creditor i is the ratio of the 
volume that country B borrows from 
creditor i relative to the total 
borrowing by country B. The 
importance of country A to creditor i 
is the ratio of the volume that 
creditor i lends to country A relative 
to total lending by creditor i. 
BIS Quarterly Review, 
consolidated banking data, Table 
9B. We construct monthly 
timeseries from the quarterly 
observations by interpolation. 
Trade share  Exports from country B to the initial 
crisis country relative to Country B's 
total exports. 
IMF: Direction of trade statistics 
Index of common overexposed fund 
investors 
Degree of dependence on fund 
investors that are overexposed to the 
initial crisis country 
Broner, Gelos, Reinhart (2006) 
Stock market size  Market value of IFC investable / 
FTSE index 
IFC investable/ FTSE index 
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Step 2: E®ect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis, restricting attention to

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Step 2: E®ect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis, additional control for




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Marginal e®ect of uncertainty on the probability of a crisis.
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